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Trade wars are the main driver of changing conditions of 
globalization observed in the second decade of the 21st century. 
They are widely manifested in great powers’ tactical behavior, 
their re-defined priorities, and the shifting balance between their 
geopolitical and economic interests. As a measure of the strength 
and influence of nation states, geopolitics has traditionally focused 
on military power, resources and demography, while the priorities 
of the economy are growth, productivity and prosperity (Global 
Risks 2015). Despite these fundamental doctrinal differences, the 
current rapprochement between geopolitics and the economy 
is best reflected in the concept of trade wars – a diverse set of 
measures such as economic sanctions, trade tariff increases or 
the introduction of quantitative limits on imported goods utilized by 
national governments to strengthen their positions by weakening 
rivals or trading partners. 
In geoeconomics, trade wars (Findlay & O’Rourke 2007; Wigell 
2016; Gens 2019) are treated as “the admixture of the logic of 
conflict with the methods of commerce” (Luttwak 1990, 19). Mair 
(2018) highlights two aspects of geoeconomics as international 
activity: 1) the use of political means to achieve economic goals 
(trade and investment agreements, state foreign trade promotion, 
governmental interference in securing raw materials, etc.); and 
2) the use of economic means to achieve political goals (control 
of markets, trade surpluses and currency reserves, strategic 
investments, economic sanctions). Grossman and Helpman (1995) 
emphasize the role of trade negotiations and political pressure from 
interest groups on tariff rates. They argue that political lobbying 
of industries, as well as pressure from national governments, 
can significantly influence tariff barriers. Economic concepts are 
dominated by opinions that point to the positive effects of the free 
exchange of goods and the movement of technology and people 
among countries, encouraging innovation and better meeting 
the social needs of their inhabitants. Nevertheless, as the 
growing number of tariffs in the 2010s has demonstrated, trade 
wars have additional effects on the economy through various 
intermediary channels, including a rise in the financing cost of 
capital caused by financial stress or a drop in investment due to 
uncertain business climate (Berthou et al. 2019). Apart from a large 
range of tariffs and paratariffs, protectionism remains a means 
of geopolitical pressure, including the economic weakening of 
hostile political regimes (Doxey 1980; Pape 1997). 
Multidirectional effects of restrictive economic measures 
imply different reactions to, expectations of, and visions of the 
broader influence they have on the international order. In this 
article, the authors raise and try to clarify the question of whether 
we are facing a temporary situation or a radical, long-term re-
shaping of rules-based international trade relations, and how the 
recent policy of the most influential states may reverse the previous 
trend of liberalization and intentions to make a borderless world. 
The ways in which particular geopolitical interests change the 
post-Cold War foundations of globalization and world geography 
of economic ties are also discussed. Whereas barrier-free trade 
is ranked among the strongest symbols of modern globalization, 
the more specific purpose of the article is to examine how the 
use of the economy in the geopolitical strategies of the world’s 
leading states affects their current participation in international 
trade and their mutual relations. The period of research is mostly 
limited to the second decade of the twenty-first century. Since the 
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Increased geopolitical competition and growing economic nationalism 
after 2014 have gradually started to slow the trend of liberalization of 
international trade. Relations among certain national states have turned 
into trade wars – a hybrid phenomenon shaped at the intersection of 
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that deepening such negative trends in the global geostrategic balance 
does to broader bilateral relations, the role of trade wars in re-shaping 
globalization’s established conditions is also discussed. 
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greatest part of recent academic literature is focused on analyzing 
US protectionist policies (Scott & Glass 2016; Steinbock 2018; Medeiros 
2019; Qui et al. 2019; Larres 2020), the authors aim to encapsulate 
this issue in a wider geographical scope by appropriate empirical 
references presenting protectionist measures undertaken and 
the reciprocal responses of other influential participants in global 
economic relations. 
The article is structured as follows. The first section 
discusses how trade wars become part of the agenda of 
international problems and how this issue is interpreted by 
theoreticians, especially in the context of the thesis of a crisis 
of globalization. The next section describes the methods applied 
in the study and presents the sources of empirical data. The 
analytical part of our research is divided into two sections. 
Firstly, publicly accessible empirical data on the introduction of 
acts liberalizing and impeding trade among the world’s largest 
economies (G20) are used to attempt to quantify and describe this 
phenomenon and to emphasize its deglobalizing effects. Further, 
in the second analytical section, the big picture of ongoing trade 
wars is outlined by a range of examples of mutually antagonistic 
measures between key international actors. The final section 
takes into consideration the obtained empirical results to draw 
the main conclusions regarding the dilemma about the future of 
globalization.
Changing conditions of globalization, shifting 
understandings of the international order
A growing number of scientists, politicians and social thinkers 
are warning that ongoing trade wars are driving the observed 
crisis of globalization (Hillebrand 2010; Yakovlev 2017; King 2018; ed. 
Diamond 2019; Amadi 2020). Looking back over the entire post-
Cold War period, in processes of both international competition 
and cooperation, two phases that we associate with the waves 
of globalization and deglobalization (Karunaratne 2012) can be 
conventionally distinguished. Each of them is characterized 
by essential, if not radical, changes in previous conditions and 
the emergence of new megatrends, which have been variously 
assessed in scientific concepts in geopolitics, economy and 
political science.
The first phase began after the end of the Cold war. In 
that period, Fukuyama (1992) formulated the concept of “the 
end of history.” It seemed that, with the disappearance of the 
global ideological conflict, the principles of liberalism would 
irreversibly dominate trade contacts between the actors involved 
in international politics and economic exchange. After many 
years of negotiations, China (in 2001) and Russia (in 2012) 
became members of the World Trade Organization. Apart from 
the recession in 2008–2009, the absence of global conflicts 
contributed to a several-fold increase in world trade – from 3.5 
trillion USD in 1990 to 9.5 trillion USD in 2018 (The World Bank Web 
Site 2020). Not only China, but also other states from the Global 
South as India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico – which 
more or less successfully have been adjusting their economic 
systems to accelerated global flows of goods, capitals and 
services – have an important share in this growth (Mukherji 2009; 
Kaplinsky & Farooki 2011; Porzecanski 2015). 
Regarding economic sanctions, they were a common 
tool of international relations in this phase, but they concerned 
countries of lesser importance to the global economy, such as 
Iraq, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Libya, Liberia, Rwanda or Sierra Leone 
(eds Bourantonis & Wiener 1995; van Bergeijk 1995). Such sanctions 
influenced more than merely the economies and political systems 
of the affected countries. In fact, the trade wars of the 1990s 
were accompanied by military power, which had a decisive role 
in achieving formulated geopolitical purposes. Another peculiarity 
was that, in the first decade after the Cold War, major sanctions 
lists were imposed by the United Nations (Cortright & Lopez 2000; 
Mack & Khan 2000; Joyner 2003). Among the peculiarities of the 
international system is the fact that the world’s greatest powers 
(in particular all the members of UN Security Council, which often 
use military means to defend their interests in various regions), 
have never been the target of sanctions introduced by the United 
Nations, in whose decision-making process they play a key role. 
The removal of many barriers to transnational flows of capital, 
goods and services inspired the developing of a range of concepts 
for changing the global order. In addition to the term “time-space 
compression” (Harvey 1989), more radical labels describing the 
shifting global conditions appeared, i.e. “the death of geography” 
(McCabe 2012) and “the end of geography” (Greig 2002; Bethlehem 
2014). In the context of the voluntary partial renunciation of state 
sovereignty (Luke 1996), the treatment of foreign policy in military 
and geopolitical terms was, if not completely eliminated, certainly 
pushed into the background. Consequently, some researchers 
were wondering if this would lead to the end of geopolitics (Toal 
1997).
The initial contours of the second phase appeared with the 
financial crisis in 2008–2009. The World Economic Forum report 
on global economic risk in 2015 noted a reversal of previous 
trends. It is claimed that the present international environment 
is characterized by increasing efforts by nation states to gain 
relative power over others, even at the expense of their own 
economic interests. The development of trade in global networks 
and growing financial ties increased the economic costs of the 
growing protectionist policies (Global Risks 2015). The symbol of 
new times for global exchange was the return to the doctrine 
of sovereignty seen in Donald Trump’s policy of economic 
nationalism (Evenett & Fritz  2019). An evolution in the policy of 
international sanctions also occurred (Gottemoeller 2007). The 
“tit-for-tat” principle (Bongardt & Torres 2018) in introducing tariffs, 
sanctions and other restrictions affected direct relations between 
the largest countries of the contemporary world. In this wave of 
trade wars, a leading role is played by governments that introduce 
sanctions against particular economic sectors, companies or 
politicians, including “smart” or “targeted” sanctions (Drezner 2003; 
Gordon 2011; Brzoska 2015). 
In the new and not entirely predictable circumstances of 
global and regional geopolitics, it turned out that the proposition 
of the end of geography was something of a caricature (Bethlehem 
2014). From the point of view of spatial order, the trend of the 
weakening of liberal politics, which was still visible in attempts 
at theoretical reflection after the financial crisis of 2008–2009 
in international relations, served as an inspiration for the far-
reaching theses of “the revenge of geography” (Kaplan 2012), “the 
return of geopolitics” (Dieter 2014), “the return of history” (King 2018), 
or even “the end of globalization” (James 2001; Jacoby 2018; King 
2018). Apart from the new geopolitical environment, the “crisis” 
and “disruption” of globalization (ed. Diamond 2019), as well as the 
new wave of “deglobalization” (Bello 2004; Hillebrand 2010; Karunaratne 
2012), have been accelerated by the rise of populist movements’ 
and states’ desire to strengthen their sovereignty. Since 2014–
2015, the shifting structure of power and its possibilities to 
impact international affairs create both opportunities and risks 
for cooperation (National Security Strategy 2015). On the one hand, 
the internal cohesion of supranational organization is declining 
slightly, as evidenced by Brexit and its still unpredictable 
consequences. On the other hand, the multipolarity of the 
geopolitical and geoeconomic order is reinforced by alternative 
initiatives, i.e., the creation of the New Development Bank by 
members of the BRICS group (eds de Oliveira & Jing 2020).
The 1990s were a period when geopolitical confrontation 
was replaced by open borders and economic cooperation, which 
contribute to the emergence of a hyper-connected world (Balsa-
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Barreiro et al. 2020) in conditions of hyperglobalization (Subramanian & 
Kessler 2013). In turn, the wave of trade wars from the second half of 
the 2010s marked the opposite trend – a return to geopolitics and 
trade deglobalization. In terms of the economic consequences 
of the last wave of trade wars, compared to the geoeconomic 
clashes known from history, the past 30 years differ significantly. 
In a globalized economy, sanctioned countries have many more 
opportunities to evade unfriendly restrictions. Being importers 
and exporters of more goods and services, most countries have 
real opportunities to expand or create new trading partnerships 
in response to economic sanctions (Economic Sanctions. Sharpening a 
Vital Foreign Policy Tool 2017).
Data and methods 
As indicated, the empirical part of the study covers two 
aspects of the current trade wars. The first concerns the number 
of protectionist and liberalizing acts introduced by and toward 
sovereign states. Their analysis for the period of 2009–2018 is 
based on data from Global Trade Alert, an organization ensuring 
“the most comprehensive coverage of policy changes affecting 
cross-border commerce” (Evenett 2019, p. 2). Attention was focused 
on the G20 countries, as their governments have the greatest 
influence on global geopolitical and geoeconomic relations.
An attempt was made to parameterize the overall relationship 
among the national states. The effectiveness of regulations was 
used to describe two types of relationships (Fig. 1):
-	 Type 1: The number of trade regulations that all countries 
have in place for a given country. This relationship shows 
how strong the attitude of all the countries of the world 
toward a given country is.
-	 Type 2: The number of trade regulations that a country has 
in place for all other countries in the world. It shows the 
policy of a country toward all other countries. 
In both cases, the calculation algorithm was the same and 
included the number of regulations introduced to inhibit and 
liberalize trade. The procedure is based on the following formula:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = H− LH + L ∗ 100%
Where:
ER – effectiveness of regulations
H – regulations restricting trade
L – regulations liberalizing the possibility of trade 
Effectiveness of regulations indicates the extent to which the 
total balance of the regulations introduced translates into a clear 
direction of impact. Because restrictions prevail, it indicates an 
inhibiting effect. This indicator eliminates the impact of the number 
of regulations, since a significant number of inhibiting procedures 
with an equally large number of liberalizing regulations minimizes 
their impact. A lower result means that the effect is more neutral, 
whereas a higher value serves as evidence for the greater 
advantage of restrictive regulations. 
The second aspect of trade wars under consideration is 
the introduction of sanctions or customs tariffs by countries and 
transnational organizations. Taking into account the increasing 
number of such measures targeted toward governments, 
economic sectors, particular companies and public persons, the 
empirical covering of this phenomenon and their geoeconomic 
and geopolitical effects cannot be comprehensively covered for 
all countries in the world. For that reason, we have limited our 
analysis mainly to restrictive measures introduced by the USA, 
China, the EU, Russia and some other geopolitically important 
states, complemented by a World Bank data analysis showing 
ongoing changes in exports and imports. On the example of 
these several cases, we outline the effects (already targeted or 
potential) of trade wars on imports and exports, as well as on 
the forced reconfiguration of the geographical structure of trade 
flows. The megatrends of breaking economic ties between both 
rivals and close allies in international politics and the widely 
applied “tit-for-tat” principle are evidenced by empirical data of 
their ongoing contribution in providing trade barriers.
Trade restrictions between the largest world economies 
Up until the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, 
there was a clear tendency for political and economic barriers 
hindering international flows of goods, services and capital to 
decrease. However, the liberalizing tendency began to slow in 
the mid-2010s. A number of political and economic phenomena 
coincided that began increasingly to undermine the rules of the 
game in the international order formed after the Cold War. In 
this section, taking into consideration the demographic weight, 
importance to international trade and geopolitical profile of 
the G20 members, the authors analyze the chief empirical 
peculiarities in providing harmful and liberalizing regulations from 
a geoeconomic and geopolitical point of view.
In the period following the global financial crisis (Fig. 2), 
the number of regulations affecting the trade process generally 
increased. The maximum value was recorded at the end of 
the period of investigation, when 2.169 restrictive acts were 
introduced. Nevertheless, in 2018 and 2019, only the US and 
China introduced reciprocal restrictions, which are not as 
numerous but are of an incomparably high magnitude. At the 
beginning of 2020, the total amount of trade affected by US tariffs 
on Chinese goods was as high as USD 550 trillion. On the other 
hand, China introduced restrictions for US goods in the amount 
of USD 185 trillion (The US–China Trade War: A Timeline 2020). As 
indicated in the report “Going It Alone? Trade Policy After Three 
Years of Populism” (2019, p. 14), “before the Populist era, China 
and the United States were responsible for ‘only’ 12% of global 
totals for discrimination against foreign commercial interests.” In 
comparison, between 2017 and 2019 the two biggest economies 
together were responsible for 23% of the world’s newly 
implemented protectionist measures.
In the entire period, inhibitory measures prevailed. They 
serve as evidence of deglobalizing trends. The greatest 
disproportion was recorded in 2018, when the share of liberalizing 
regulations was as low as 24% (Fig. 2). In turn, the situation was 
most favorable in 2016. Liberalization decrees accounted for 
Figure 1. Types of trade relations between countries
Source: elaborated by the authors
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over 33% of all regulations. In the whole analyzed period, the 
largest share of restrictions (almost 40%) concerned subsidies 
(excluding export subsidies) – bailouts, state loans, financial 
grants, tax or social insurance relief, etc. These are followed 
by export-related measures (20.3%) – export quotas, export 
bans, tax-based export incentive; tariff measures (13.6%); and 
contingent trade-protective measures (10.6%).
There was a great convergence between the number 
of regulations hindering trade and those facilitating it, i.e. the 
observed increases or decreases in such decisions were parallel. 
This may indicate close links in the global economy that require a 
constant search for new partners and markets. These regulations 
are therefore a mechanism that changes the direction of the flow 
of goods. However, their causes are not market-related, but 
they are regulatory and result from geopolitical decisions. The 
increasing number of regulatory acts can be associated with the 
rapid growth of trade. Nonetheless, this is just one of the possible 
explanations. Evenett (2019) provides evidence for the growing 
importance of protectionism, which is undoubtedly among the 
main drivers of trade wars. The author specifies that, in 2018, 
61% of world goods exports competed against a foreign firm 
whose government was making available a financial inducement 
to export. Over 34% of world goods exports in 2018 faced other 
(non-export-related) trade distortions in third markets. A fifth of 
world goods exports competed in foreign markets against a local 
firm bailed out or in receipt of another form of financial aid from 
the government (Evenett 2019). 
In Type 1 trade relations, acts that hamper economic 
exchange are most common, as confirmed by the overview for 
G20 countries (Table 1). The number of regulations does not 
always correlate with the state’s demographic potential or the 
openness of the national economy, e.g. France, Italy, South Korea 
and Canada are subject to a large number of restrictions imposed 
by other countries. The country for which the largest number of 
liberalizing acts were introduced is the USA, at over 3.100. The 
next positions are taken by Germany, Italy and France, while China 
occupies ninth place. As a result of its relatively low share and 
less influence on the global economy, Russia is only 35th. In turn, 
China is the country against which the largest number of inhibitory 
regulations have been introduced. It is slightly ahead of Germany, 
the USA and Italy concerning the number of such regulations. 
The results show that the values of the effectiveness of 
regulations are relatively close and vary between 30 and 50%. 
Two categories may be clearly distinguished: the first comprises 
only two states (China and Brazil) where the indicator’s value is 
between 40 and 50%. Meanwhile, the results of all other G20 
members vary from 30 to 40%.
China is the country with the largest surplus of trade-restricting 
regulations over liberalizing ones (over 3800). Compared to all 
the regulations introduced for Chinese businesses, the surplus of 
regulations inhibiting trade was the highest, and the effectiveness 
of the regulations was as high as 43%. In no other country with 
a significant share in international trade has this figure exceeded 
40%. This demonstrates that China’s growing role in global 
exports and its strong positive trade balance can be linked to 
its expansive economic policy. Among the G20 countries, Brazil 
stands out with the highest effectiveness of regulations.
The next element of the analysis concerns the differences 
between the number of trade regulations introduced by the 
G20 members on other states in the world in the period 2009–
2018 (Table 2). These are Type 2 relations. As for liberalizing 
regulations, the first places are occupied by China, Brazil and 
India. Their low labor costs and, consequently, their high level 
of competitiveness mean that liberalizing acts do not pose a 
threat to them. Moreover, liberalization of imports may improve 
re-exports, where a significant part is first imported from other 
countries. As far as restrictive regulations are concerned, the 
leaders in this respect are large, geopolitically important states, 
with China, the USA, Germany, India and Russia holding the first 
five places. 
Figure 2. Trade regulations between countries worldwide (2009–2018)
Source: own elaboration based on Global Trade Alert data (www.globaltradealert.org)
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In contrast to the Type 1 relations, the number of introduced 
regulations and their effectiveness is more diversified. The 
difference between the states with the highest and lowest levels 
of effectiveness of regulations is 72%. The greatest effectiveness 
(over 65%) of such regulations characterizes rich countries such 
as Japan, Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United States and Germany, 
where restrictive measures clearly dominate. In the case of 
China, with the highest number of regulations, the relationship 
between the inhibiting and liberalizing mechanisms is much more 
balanced, and the effectiveness ratio is only 19%. 
Trade wars between key international actors 
Trade wars between geopolitical rivals
Hostile actions undertaken between geopolitical rivals 
and opponents (e.g., USA/EU–Russia, USA–China, USA–Iran, 
Russia–Ukraine), confirm the return of classical mechanisms of 
geoeconomics (Luttwak 1990; Findlay & O’Rourke 2007; Mair 2018). This 
section will take a closer look at the key moments of the trade 
wars between the world’s greatest powers and the deglobalizing 
effects they have.
Restrictions against Russia imposed by the US and the EU 
during the Ukrainian crisis in March 2014 accelerated geopolitically 
motivated trade wars (Aalto & Forsberg 2016; Bouwmeester & 
Oosterhaven 2017). Until this turning point, unlike the Soviet Union, 
Moscow had not been subjected to Western sanctions (Makasheva 
2016). Initially, actions by Western countries included a wide 
range of measures against Russian companies and specific 
politicians and business people. Unlike the subsequent US trade 
tensions with the EU and China, both sanctions (and Russia’s 
counter-sanctions) were provided due to purely geopolitical 
reasons: the annexation of Crimea, support for pro-Russian 
separatists in Donbas, Washington’s accusations against Russia 
concerning interference with the American elections, etc. Russia 
is no longer invited to G7 summits. The NATO–Russia Council 
was suspended for several years. The Russian government 
almost immediately imposed retaliatory trade sanctions on those 
countries that joined the anti-Russian restrictions. The counter-
sanctions mainly concerned imports of agricultural products. The 
reduction of imports became the chief driver of price increases 
and, indirectly, of a deterioration in product quality in Russia 
(Makasheva 2016). From the very beginning of the sanctions policy 
against Russia, its authorities have implemented a strategy of 
import substitution (Tolkachev & Teplyakov 2018). This is seen as a 
factor that strengthens state sovereignty, but, on the other hand, 
it also makes the national economy more isolated in the global 
economy. 
Until 2014, exports to Russia represented 4.25% of total 
food exports from EU countries. This share was much higher 
only for some items. For example, almost one-third of cheese, 
fruit, vegetables and butter produced in the EU was delivered 






Difference in number of 
regulations [H - L]
Effectiveness of 
regulations ER, % 
China 8 933 6 394 2 539 3 855 43
Germany 9 346 6 340 3 006 3 334 36
USA 9 289 6 136 3 153 2 983 32
Italy 8 824 6 023 2 801 3 222 37
France 8 653 5 856 2 797 3 059 35
United Kingdom 8 240 5 624 2 616 3 008 37
Republic of Korea 8 144 5 529 2 615 2 914 36
Japan 8 109 5 458 2 651 2 807 35
Canada 7 579 5 264 2 315 2 949 39
Mexico 6 485 4 308 2 177 2 131 33
Saudi Arabia 2 391 1 920 1 011 909 38
South Africa 5 109 3 325 1 784 1 541 30
Indonesia 6 269 4 095 2 174 1 921 31
Argentina 4 159 2 708 1 451 1 257 30
Australia 5 777 3 842 1 935 1 907 33
India 7 778 5 147 2 631 2 516 32
Brazil 4 393 4 393 2 179 2 214 50
Turkey 5 440 3 722 1 718 2 004 37
Russia 4 869 3 261 1 608 1 633 34
Source: own elaboration based on Global Trade Alert data (www.globaltradealert.org)
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to Russia. Due to Russian counter-sanctions, EU countries took 
action to stabilize national food markets, reorient production to 
new markets, and support the most affected producers. The 
measures taken by the EU weakened the impact that Russia’s 
embargo had on EU exports. One year after its introduction, 
exports from the EU of those products banned for import by 
Russia had increased by 4.8% in May 2015 compared to August 
2014. This was due to the geographical reorientation of exports 
and growing supply to South Korea, China, Turkey, Hong Kong 
and Egypt (Makasheva 2016). In general, the sanctions imposed 
on the import of certain groups of goods and the operation of 
some companies from Russia, as well as the Russian retaliatory 
sanctions, harmed the volume of trade with the EU. This trend 
continued in the first two years after 2014 and covered exports, 
imports and total trade value. In 2016, the value of trade with the 
EU fell by half compared to 2012 (Fig. 3). However, fluctuations 
in trade due to purely geopolitical factors did not affect the nature 
of the relationships, as the trade balance remained unfavorable 
for the EU. This balance was slightly better in 2019, when it 
amounted to EUR ˗66.5 billion. Another key trend that may 
indicate a weakening of the sanctions’ impact is the renewed 
increase in trade in 2017 and 2018. This resulted from the desire 
to “normalize” and return to trade relations beneficial to both 
parties. The available data indicates that Russia is slightly better 
positioned thanks to the increased value of exports to the EU. 
Compared to the strictly economic objectives of US trade 
restrictions toward partner countries from the Asia Pacific region 
and the EU (Fetzer & Schwarz 2019; Larres 2020), trade wars with 
China undoubtedly have both geopolitical and commercial goals. 
They are intended to slow down the implementation of China’s 
global strategy in the Xi Jinping era in technology, investment and 
trade, which is incompatible with American interests (Feldkircher & 
Korhonen 2014; Blanchard & Flint 2017; Pang et al. 2017; Medeiros 2019). 
The protectionist measures are subject to different 
assessments. Some economists claim that trade liberalization 
and an increase in imports of industrial commodities impose 
pressure on American wages (Krugman 2007), which serves as one 
of the arguments for introducing tariffs on Chinese manufactured 
goods. Nevertheless, in the globalizing world, this issue is 
more complex. While in the classical trade theories, goods are 
completely made within one country’s borders and shipped to 
another, much of the US imports from China contain value created 
in other locations, including American intellectual property (Lovely 
and Liang 2018). Trump’s penchant for tariffs, actions against 
Huawei, and expansive trade demands have destabilized the 
broader relationship (Medeiros 2019). Despite divergent views 
on the strictly economic impact of these activities, they have a 
rational economic base since they aim to strengthen the national 
economy by reducing negative effects on imports and reducing 
the dependence on Chinese goods and technologies. 






Difference in number of 
regulations [H - L]
Effectiveness of 
regulations ER, %
China 4 781 2 854 1 927 927 19
USA 2 384 2 065 319 1 746 73
Germany 1 950 1 608 342 1 266 65
India 1 352 957 395 562 42
Brazil 1 288 743 545 198 15
Russia 1 170 843 327 519 44
United Kingdom 1 112 770 342 428 38
Argentina 1 078 759 319 440 41
Italy 1 053 716 337 379 36
France 1 027 690 337 353 34
Canada 867 786 81 705 81
Australia 849 356 49 309 36
Japan 682 637 45 592 87
Indonesia 618 403 215 188 30
Turkey 463 335 128 207 45
South Africa 430 268 160 108 25
Saudi Arabia 313 286 27 259 83
Republic of Korea 290 209 81 128 44
Mexico 289 198 91 107 37
Source: own elaboration based on Global Trade Alert data (www.globaltradealert.org)
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The first half of 2018 saw the most intense exchange of 
regulations between Washington and Beijing. Early that year, 
the USA introduced tariffs on imports of Chinese solar panels, 
washing machines, steel and aluminum. China responded by 
introducing tariffs on selected US products. According to Global 
Trade Alert, the most restrictive regulations apply to computing 
machinery and parts, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, 
chemical products, and products of steel, iron and other metals. 
Protectionist measures reversed the negative values of the US 
trade balance with China reaching USD ˗345 billion (Fig. 4). In 
2019, the Chinese economy recorded its lowest annual growth 
rate since 1990.
The countries affected by various trade barriers have taken 
steps to geographically reconfigure their exports and imports. 
In the most significant states, World Bank data shows diverging 
trends (The World Bank Web Site 2020). Between 2013 and 2018, EU 
exports recorded an increase of more than 2%, while Russia’s 
exports grew by 5%, with a clear decline in 2016 and 2017 due 
to difficulties in the first years after the introduction of Western 
sanctions. Brazil and Turkey also showed an increase in exports. 
The USA, which traditionally has one of the lowest shares of 
exports in its GDP, recorded a decline of 1.3%. The downward 
trend in exports as a percentage of GDP is even more noticeable 
in China. Since 2016, this indicator has remained below 20% and 
is far from the best result achieved in 2006 (36%). 
In turn, the trade wars have not affected the ratio of imports to 
Russia’s GDP, which in the period 2013–18 was still at 20%. The 
minimization of economic relations with the US has not affected 
Russia to a great extent due to their relatively small volume. For 
example, at the end of 2013, the volume of accumulated Russian 
investments in the US economy amounted to USD 4.1 billion, 
while in the Netherlands they are assessed at USD 23.3 billion. At 
the same time, American investments in Russia were estimated 
at USD 10.3 billion, while the value of Dutch investments was 
almost seven times greater (Klinova & Sidorova 2014). The EU, on 
the other hand, experienced a more than 2% increase in imports 
of goods and services. Some of the EU’s largest economies, 
i.e. Germany, France, Italy and Spain, show a similar trend with 
comparable values. On the other hand, a decrease in imports 
was recorded by the USA (˗1.2%) and China (˗3.3%) (The World 
Bank Web Site 2020). 
Trade wars between allies and partners  
A significant feature of sanctions policies is their use against 
close trade partners. A typical example are the relations between 
Russia and Turkey, the two Eurasian forces that were on the way 
to building a new “strategic axis” (Erşen 2011). Bilateral tensions 
were accelerated after the military incident in the Turkish–Syrian 
air border zone in late 2015, which became a turning point in 
Russian–Turkish relations. Russia took steps against its Turkish 
partner, i.e. limiting trips to Turkey for tourist purposes, freezing 
cooperation in construction projects and restricting imports of 
Turkish agricultural products. This led to losses for the sanctioned 
sectors of the Turkish economy and negatively affected Russian 
consumers. In addition to the direct effect on the decline in trade, 
the number of Russian tourists in Turkey decreased fourfold in 
2016 (Coşkun 2019). In the end, however, the pragmatism of the 
two parties of that interstate conflict prevailed. Russia and Turkey 
quickly began to normalize mutual relations, regardless of their 
complexity and conflicting interests in Syria, the Caucasus and 
North Africa.
Apart from short-term episodes such as the deterioration 
in relations between Russia and Turkey in 2015–2016, many 
other events accompany the harming of cooperation between 
close partners in international relations, including revision of its 
previously established principles. At the end of the 2010s, the 
Figure 3. Dynamics of EU–Russia trade in 2009–2018
Source: own elaboration based on Eurostat data (https://ec.europa.eu)
Vol. 25 • No. 2 • 2021 • pp. 99-109 • ISSN: 2084-6118 • DOI: 10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051 
MISCELLANEA GEOGRAPHICA – REGIONAL STUDIES ON DEVELOPMENT
106
most active policy, both protectionist toward the domestic market 
and sanctioning, is being pursued by the United States in their 
“[...] exceptionally assertive trade policy geared toward achieving 
a ‘free, fair and reciprocal’ (with an emphasis on that last word) 
trading system” (Consequences of US trade policy on EU–US trade relations 
and the global trading system 2018, p. 4). After Trump came to power, a 
trade war was waged – and not only against Russia, China and 
Iran, but also aimed at close economic partners and geopolitical 
allies. To protect its internal market, the US started to introduce 
duties on various goods imported from the EU, Japan, China, 
Mexico, Canada and other countries. Consequently, negotiations 
toward a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership with the European Union were suspended, a 
re-negotiation of NAFTA was launched, and the US–Korea 
agreement was amended (Consequences of US trade policy on EU–US 
trade relations and the global trading system 2018). 
The Asia Pacific region was also highly affected by the 
new protectionist line. It was the main geographical direction of 
US economic expansion (Wenzhao 1999; Parameswaran 2014). The 
administration of Barack Obama developed the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership agreement as an effective tool for this policy, bringing 
together the USA and eleven other countries, without China’s 
participation (Yakovlev 2017). In 2015, the US trade deficit with the 
countries of this region amounted to USD 178 billion in 2015 (Scott 
and Glass 2016). This negative trend was Trump’s key argument 
for the American withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement for free trade in 2017 (Yakovlev 2017).
To conclude this concise empirical overview, the growing 
number of geopolitically motivated sanctions and counter-
sanctions, in which companies from both sides of the conflict 
suffer economic losses, needs to be highlighted. The larger 
negative effects are mainly exerted on the weaker (in economic 
terms) partners, including the reduction in foreign investment. 
Nevertheless, Western states’ restrictions on Russia, Iran or 
China do not alter their policy on key regional geostrategic and 
security issues. In turn, economic tensions between the leading 
global and regional powers are often temporary. The measures 
antagonizing mutual relationships do not always drastically 
change long-term bilateral relations. 
Discussion and conclusion
This article aimed to examine how the practical 
rapprochement between geopolitics and geoeconomics in 
international politics of the world’s largest states affects their trade 
relations and in what way it changes the global order established 
after the end of the Cold War. An attempt was also made to 
contextualize the impact of trade wars on globalization processes 
in a broader geographical scope, which goes beyond the analyses 
of growing restrictions in US–China relations. The lack of full 
and comparable data (Evenett 2019), particularly concerning the 
geographical directions, kind and duration of sanctions, impede 
the elaboration of a systemic and comprehensive picture of this 
element of trade wars. 
This article has examined only specifically selected empirical 
aspects of the current trade wars that illustrate introduced trade 
barriers and sanctions. Based on the regulations that inhibit 
and liberalize the trade exchange of G20 members, two types 
of relations were identified. An index of the effectiveness of 
regulations that balance both types of relations was proposed. 
It reflects the cumulative difference in the liberalizing and 
restrictive impacts of the totality of regulations. According to the 
obtained results, the greatest effectiveness of Type 1 relations 
was found for inhibitory regulations against China. In turn, the 
highest effectiveness of regulations introduced on other countries 
(Type 2) was characteristic of Japan, Saudi Arabia, Canada and 
the USA, which proves their protectionist attitudes. 
As empirical analysis confirmed, in the late 2010s, there was 
an increase in governments’ activities described as trade wars 
on a global and regional scale. This phenomenon undoubtedly 
requires additional research, but the results obtained allow us 
to draw some more general conclusions about megatrends in 
bilateral and multilateral trade wars. In fact, all countries that are 
important in global development are initiators of trade wars. The 
countries with the largest share of the global economy are also the 
Figure 4. Dynamics of trade of goods between USA and China, 1990–2018
Source: own elaboration based on United States Census Bureau data (www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html)
Vol. 25 • No. 2 • 2021 • pp. 99-109 • ISSN: 2084-6118 • DOI: 10.2478/mgrsd-2020-0051 
MISCELLANEA GEOGRAPHICA – REGIONAL STUDIES ON DEVELOPMENT
107
most active in creating both harmful and liberalizing regulations 
of Type 1 and Type 2. This may be due to the multitude of types 
of goods they trade and their numerous geographical directions 
of foreign economic relations. 
It is noteworthy that the studied period seems too short to 
give an unambiguous answer as to whether we are facing a deep 
and long-term crisis of globalization or whether the series of trade 
wars is more of a transitional period. Although empirical data are 
also insufficient to solve this dilemma, we can certainly argue that 
concepts such as “the end of globalization” (James 2001; Jacoby 
2018) are are as yet unwarranted. One can agree with Findlay and 
O’Rourke (2007, p. 535) that “history suggests that globalization is a 
fragile and easily reversible process, with implications not just 
for international trade, but for the international division of labor 
and economic growth as well.” In the context of increasing trade 
wars, this means that King’s thesis of a return of history is fully 
justified. As the author claims, globalization concerns the return 
of global powers, and it simply failed to deliver prosperity for all 
(King 2018). Nonetheless, contemporary globalization is not over. 
The observed stagnation can instead be explained in terms of 
deglobalization (Bello 2004; Karunaratne 2012) and the breaking rules 
of hyperglobalization (Balsa-Barreiro et al. 2020; Subramanian & Kessler 
2013) as an effect of the massive re-politicization of economic 
relations (Dieter 2014). 
As Luttwak specified (1990: 20), “In the past, when 
commercial quarrels evolved into political quarrels, they could 
become military confrontations almost automatically; and in turn 
military confrontations could readily lead to war.” Even though 
the scale of ongoing trade wars is unlikely to be analogous to 
historical examples in terms of exchange value, there is, so far, 
no indication of the real danger of an explosion and large-scale 
military conflict between superpowers. Nevertheless, the global 
order and the rules of international relations are undergoing deep, 
far-reaching transformations. The importance of state borders is 
once again returning, stopping the quest for a borderless world. 
The greatest powers have attempted to re-organize the rules 
of interactions of globally integrated national and transnational 
entities and are causing a crisis of globalization. However, it is 
too early to confirm the thesis of the end or fall of globalization. 
Despite the rise in mutual restrictions between the major military 
and economic powers making the world a less predictable place, 
the number of liberal trade regulations in effect is still relatively 
large, and the system of international economic relations remains 
more open and interdependent than any other in history.
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